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EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN:'
DICKENS TO DIGITAL
Joseph J.Beard*
I. INTRODUCTION

A newspaper article dated January 29th predicted that a new
technological discovery, "[i]f introduced into this or any other
country [would bring] an end to copyrights."' 2 Was this new
discovery some super-descrambler, an untraceable peer-to-peer
system? No, it was "a new and extraordinary discovery made in
Prussia by which printed works of any kind [could] be copied with
perfect accuracy, and copies multiplied with no further expense than
the cost of paper and press-work.",3 The January 29th in question
was that of-1842! This incident demonstrates that when one
contemplates contemporary technology/copyright issues, indeed
"everything old is new again", and that perhaps there are lessons to
be learned from days long gone. As the lyrics to the song caution,
rainy day."4
"Don't throw the past away, you might need it some
It is perhaps no more than coincidence that the same issue-in
fact, the same page and column-of the paper, The Albion,
predicting the demise of copyright, also mentioned the visit of
Charles Dickens to the United States. 5 It is, however, no coincidence
that I turn to Dickens and his times to demonstrate that the copyright
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.S. (Electrical
Engineering), Tufts University; J.D., Suffolk University Law School; M.B.A.,
Babson College; L.L.M. (Taxation), Boston University School of Law; S.J.D.,

Harvard University. Professor Beard thanks his research assistant, Christopher

D. Papaleo, J.D. Candidate, 2005, St. John's University School of Law.
1. PETER ALLEN & CAROLE BAYER SAGER, Everything Old Is New Again,
on CONTINENTAL AMERICAN (A & M Records 1974).
2. ALBION (New York), Jan. 29, 1842, at 55 (emphasis added).
3. Id.
4. ALLEN & SAGER, supra note 1.
5. ALBION, supra note 2 (announcing the anticipated arrival of Charles

Dickens to the United States).
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issues that we face in the digital environment of the twenty-first
century are not all that different from those faced by Dickens and his
contemporaries in the analog world of the nineteenth century. To
illustrate my point, I shall focus on two issues of the many that might
be discussed: (1) The link between nineteenth century "reorigination" and late twentieth/twenty-first century "transformative
use"; and (2) copyright term legislation.
II. RE-ORIGINATION, A NINETEENTH CENTURY ANCESTOR OF
TRANSFORMATIVE USE?

A. Two Novels, Two Parodies
Two novels separated by more than a century and half, one
written in England, the other in the United States, bear an uncanny
similarity to one another. Each was based, in part, on an earlier
work, and neither subsequent novelist had the permission of the
copyright owner. Each novelist renamed the characters populating
the earlier work, but in such a way that the characters were readily
recognizable. Each also added characters not found in the original
work. Both novelists used story elements from the earlier work, but
also added new story elements. Not surprisingly, each was the
subject of a lawsuit brought by the owner of the copyright in the
earlier work. Perhaps surprisingly, neither was found liable. Beyond
these similarities lies one more-the two novels were linked to each
other by Charles Dickens!
It is time now to identify the two novels, their authors, and the
antecedent works on which they were based. In 1837 England, The
Penny Pickwick: The Post-HumorousNotes of the Pickwickian Club
edited by Bos (probably Thomas Peckett Press) was published by
Edward Lloyd of London. 6 The work was based on The Posthumous
Papers of the Pickwick Club edited by Boz (Charles Dickens) and
published by Chapman and Hall beginning in 1836.' In 2001, The
Wind Done Gone by Alice Randall was published by Houghton
Mifflin Company of Boston. 8 The novel was, of course, based on the
6.
1837).

THE POST-HUMOROUS PAPERS OF THE PICKWICKIAN CLUB

("Bos" ed.,

7. CHARLES DICKENS, THE PICKWICK PAPERS (James Kinsley ed., Oxford

Univ. Press 1986) (1837).
8. ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001).
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novel by Margaret Mitchell, Gone with the Wind, published by the
Macmillan Company in 1936. 9 Oh, before I forget-the Dickens
connection between these two works? Besides the author's reference
to Dickens' Great Expectations in her novel,' 0 The Wind Done Gone,
Randall's publisher Houghton Mifflin is the ultimate successor to the
Boston publishing firm, Ticknor and Fields, Dickens' authorized
American publisher.l' One can only wonder what Dickens' reaction
would be to his American publisher (or more accurately, its
successor) publishing a work bearing some of the same
characteristics as The Penny Pickwick.
As I said, The Wind Done Gone and The Penny Pickwick
renamed characters. In The Wind Done Gone, Scarlett O'Hara
became "Other," Rhett Butler became "R.B.," Ashley Wilkes
became "Dreamy Gentleman," and Melanie Wilkes became "Mealy
Mouth."
In The Penny Pickwick, Samuel Pickwick became
"Christopher Pickwick," Tracy Tupman became "Percy Tupnall,"
Augustus Snodgrass became "Arthur Snodgreen," and Nathanial
Winkle became "Matthew Winkeltop." Both novels also added new
characters. In The Wind Done Gone, characters not found in Gone
with the Wind included "Frederick Douglass" and the
"Congressman." The Penny Pickwick also added characters not
found in Dickens' novel, including "Captain Julius Caesar Fitzflash,"
"John White," and "Betty Bodger." In an article of this length and to
which these novels are but backdrop to the legal analysis, I shall say
no more than that both successor novels copied plot elements from
their respective predecessors and each contained new plot elements.
B. Two Suits
1. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.
When the trustee of the Mitchell Trust, SunTrust, brought suit
9. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).

10. "In all the literature I know, only one book comes close to what I feel.
This is Great Expectations. Pip has a guilty family. Almost guiltier than
mine." RANDALL, supra note 8, at 192.
11. See R. Shelton Mackenzie, The Dickens Controversy, in LIFE OF
CHARLES DICKENS app. 1 (Philadelphia, T.B. Peterson & Bros. 1870). A
history of Houghton Mifflin is available online. Houghton Mifflin Company
History, at http://www.hmco.com/company/abouthm/company-history.html

(last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
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against Houghton Mifflin for its publication of The Wind Done
Gone, it alleged copyright infringement, violation of the Lanham
Act, and deceptive trade practices. 12 In vacating the injunction
granted by the district court, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
transformative nature of Randall's work.' 3 "Transformative use"
became part of the lexicon of fair use with the publication in 1990 of
an article by Judge Pierre N. Leval,' 4 at that time on the bench at the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
In his article, Judge Leval opined that the justification for a fair use

claim "turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative."'5 He went on to state, "The use must be
productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner
or for a different purpose from the original."' 16 Judge Leval's
transformative use was picked up in the U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:17 "[T]he goal of

copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by
the creation of transformative works."' 8 Since then, the term
"transformative use" has become a part of federal jurisprudence.19

12. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D.
Ga. 2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (1lth Cir. 2001).
13. "Randall has fully employed those conscripted elements from [Gone
with the Wind] to make war against it. Her work... reflects transformative
value." SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271 (emphasis added). "There are
numerous instances in which [The Wind Done Gone] appropriates elements of
[Gone with the Wind] and then transforms them for purposes of commentary."
Id. at 1272 (emphasis added).
14. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a FairUse Standard, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1105 (1990).
15. Id. at 1111.
16. Id.
17. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).18. Id. at 579. (emphasis added).
19. E.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 357 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2004) (Noonan, J., dissenting); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d
Cir. 2004); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003);
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entme't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir.
2003); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002);
Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Nufiez v. Caribbean
Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); Sundeman v. Seajoy Soc'y, Inc.,
142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998).
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2. Chapman & Hall v. Lloyd

When Chapman and Hall sought relief in Chancery against
Edward Lloyd, the complaint alleged fraud.2 In that regard, the bill
was similar to the pleadings of SunTrust as to the Lanham Act and
deceptive trade practices. Why didn't Chapman and Hall also file a
copyright infringement claim as SunTrust did some century and a
half later? Re-origination is the likely answer. What was reorigination? One searches in vain in the indices to nineteenth and
early twentieth century treatises for the term re-origination. 2 '
However, it was a term dear to those who would profit from the
works of others. Richard Egan Lee published a weekly known as
Parley's Illuminated Library. The Preface to Volume 3 of Parley's
Penny Library uses the term:
[A] word, in conclusion, as to THE LAW on this subject. It
will not we conceive be disputed that there is not the
"shadow of a shade" of a decision, either in equity or at nisi
prius, from the day of Lord Cowper to those of Lord
Eldon--or even those of Brougham or Lyndhurst-against

a writerfairly exercising his own mind by

"RE-ORIGINATING

AN ORIGINAL WORK"

[T]he right as well as the benefit of condensing and cheaply
diffusing the materials of knowledge will be most
assumedly claimed and exercised.22
Note the justification of re-origination by the "benefit of
condensing and cheaply diffusing." 23 This is a reference to decisions
favorable to unlicensed, butfair, abridgments.
20. Vice-Chancellor's Court, TIMES (London), June 9, 1837, at 7 (stating
Chapman & Hall v. Lloyd "was not one of copyright, but of fraudulent
imitation of a work calculated to deceive a portion of mankind.").
21. E.g., GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown, 1847); CHARLES
PALMER PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (London, V. & R. Stevens, &
Haynes. 1863); THOMAS EDWARD SCRUTrON, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT

(1903); WALTER ARTHUR COPINGER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (4th ed. 1904);
RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912); J.
BROOK RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1913).

22. C.H. Simonds, Peter Parley and Dickens, 19 DICKENSIAN 129, 132
(1923) (final emphasis added).
23. Id.
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Re-origination has its roots in a handful of eighteenth and early
nineteenth century English decisions dealing with abridgements.
Today, of course, in the United States, "abridgements" are within the
definition of "derivative work, ' 24 and the right to make a derivative
work is an exclusive right of the author.2 5 In eighteenth century
England, however, an abridgement might not only not infringe, but
might indeed be treated as a new book.
In 1740, in Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Hardwicke, held that:
Where books are colourably shortened only, they are
undoubtedly within the meaning of the act of Parliament,
and are a mere evasion of the statute, and cannot be called
an abridgment.
But this must not be carried so far as to restrain
persons from making a real and fair abridgment, for
abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book,
because not only the paper and print, but the invention,
learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them, and
in many cases are extremely useful, though in some
instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the sense
of an author.
If I should extend the rule so far as to restrain all
abridgments, it would be of mischievous consequence, for
the books of the learned, les Journels des Scavans, and
several others that might be mentioned, would be brought
within the meaning of this act of parliament. 27
But not every abridgment was found to be "fair." In the 1753
decision, Tonson v. Walker,28 while the Court admitted a fair
abridgement was not a piracy, it held
the addition of twenty-eight
29
evasion.,
mere
"a
was
notes to 1,500
The 1774 opinion in Anonymous v. Newbery30 of Lord
Chancellor Apsly, assisted by Mr. Justice Blackstone, "whose
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
25. Id. § 106(2).
26. 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740).
27. Id. at 490 (internal citation omitted).
28. 36 Eng.Rep. 1017, 1020 (Ch.1752).
29. Id.
30. 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch. 1774).
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31
knowledge and skill in his profession was universally known,"
held:
That to constitute a true and proper abridgment of a
work the whole must be preserved in its sense: and then the
act of abridgment is an act of 'understanding, employed in
carrying a large work into a smaller compass, and
rendering it less expensive, and more convenient both to the
time and use of the reader. Which made an abridgment in
the nature of a new and a meritorious work.
That this had been done by Mr. Newbery, whose
edition might be read in the fourth part of the time, and all
the substance preserved, and conveyed in language as good
or better than in the original, and in a more agreeable and
useful manner ....
[A]n abridgement, where the understanding is
...
employed in retrenching unnecessary and uninteresting
circumstances, which rather deaden the narration, is not an
act of plagiarism upon the original work, nor against any
property of the author in it, but an allowable and
meritorious work.
And that this abridgment of32 Mr.
Newbery's falls within these reasons and descriptions.
Note that the Lord Chancellor's opinion "carrying a large work into a
smaller compass and rendering it less expensive" 33 is reflected in
Lee's justification
of "re-origination" of "condensing and cheaply
34
diffusing."
In Dodsley v. Kinnersley,35 an abridgement of Dr. Johnson's
Rasselas less than one-tenth the size of the original was held not to
be a piracy.36 But it is significant to note that the language in
Dodsley anticipated twentieth/twenty-first century analysis: "No
certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgement; but every
case must depend on its own circumstances."37 Thus, nineteenth
century re-origination had its birth in the eighteenth century

31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Simonds, supra note 22, at 132.
27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761).
Id.
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
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abridgement decisions. That pirates played fast and loose with the
notion of re-origination does not detract from the very effective role
it played at least until 1844,38 as will be seen.
While Chapman and Hall did not ultimately prevail in their
complaint in Chancery, there was sufficient reason to at least claim
fraud. After all, the two titles were very similar: "The Posthumous
Papers" v. "The Post-Humorous Notes" and "Pickwick Club" v.
"Pickwickian Club." On each cover, the artwork bore the word
"Pickwick" in large print although otherwise the covers were, in
truth, dissimilar. There were the fictitious characters "Samuel
Pickwick" v. "Christopher Pickwick" and "Tracy Tupman" v. "Percy
Tupnall." Also compare "Boz" and "Bos" as editor, and "Phiz" and
"Phis" as illustrator. Yet, Vice-Chancellor Sir Lancelot Shadwell
was unconvinced that fraud had occurred and so he left Chapman
and Hall to seek relief from the law side, which they ultimately
decided against. 39 Still, one has to ask why Chapman and Hall's
legal team had not brought a count for copyright infringement. After
all, some plot elements were copied from the Dickens novel. Others
were new, however.
So while there are no extant records
illuminating why Chapman and Hall's legal team did not base their
claim in part on copyright infringement, the reason may be that they
thought they would be met by a successful defense of re-origination.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a year later, in 1838,
another of Dickens' publishers, Richard Bentley, and Dickens sought
40
an injunction against the unauthorized printing of Oliver Twist.
Dickens had agreed to write Oliver Twist for publication in Bentley's
Miscellany.4 ' It was not long before the work was reprinted
Francis Basset Shenstone
elsewhere and without permission.
Flyndell began publishing installments of Oliver Twist in his
38. RICHARDSON, supra note 21, at 107.

39. Vice-Chancellor's Court, supra note 20. Finding that a sufficient case
for fraud was not made, the Vice-Chancellor indicated that the plaintiff could
bring an action to establish "that there had been an infringement of their right,
and damage sustained." Id. Mr. Knight, counsel for the plaintiff, "did not
know whether the matter was worth bringing an action," but accepted the
liberty provided by the court. Id.
40. Vice-Chancellor's Court, supra note 20 (reporting on hearing on
Wednesday May 2, 1838 in the case of Bentley v. Flyndell).
41. Kathleen Tillotson, Introduction to CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST,
at vii-viii (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1982) (1838).
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newspaper, The Birmingham Journal, beginning in 1837 and
continuing into 1838.42 At the end of each installment, Flyndell
stated that the article would be continued in the next paper.43 On
behalf of Bentley, Mr. Knight Bruce made application to the Court
ex parte for an injunction. 44 He stated that "Bentley did not
complain of what came within the limits of fair quotation" but that it
was obvious that the whole of Oliver Twist was being reprinted.45 In
his affidavit, Bentley noted that the newspaper was sold at a lower
price than the Miscellany.46 The Vice-Chancellor referred to a
similar case involving a paper named-tellingly-The Thief "which
was published with an expressed declaration of its intention to insert
from time to time original articles from other publications without
The Vice-Chancellor, stating "he felt no
any alteration."47
hesitation," granted the injunction.4 8 In Bentley, the work had been
reprinted virtually ipsissima verba; there was no re-origination, only
slavish reproduction. Clearly, the reproduction was a superceding
use.
While Bentley v. Flyndell was a victory for authors and
publishers, it must be remembered that it involved no re-origination
and did not dampen the ardor of the likes of Edward Lloyd. In fact,
Lloyd went on to publish his own re-originations of several Dickens
novels under such titles as Pickwick in America in 1838, 49 The Life
51
and Adventures of Oliver Twiss in 1839,50 Nickelas Nickelbery,
Mister Humfries' Clock in 1840,52 and Barnaby Budge in 1841.
G.M.W. Reynolds authored Pickwick Abroad or the Tour in
France,54 which first appeared in serial form and was later published
42. Vice-Chancellor's Court,supra note 20.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Bos., PICKWICK INAMERICA! (London, E. Lloyd 1838).

50. Bos., THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TwIss (London, E. Lloyd

1839).

51. Bos., NICKELAS NICKELBERY (London, E. Lloyl [i.e., Lloyd] 1840).
52. Bos., MISTER HUMFRIES' CLOCK (London, E. Lloyd 1840).
53. Bos., BARNABY BUDGE (E. Lloyd 1841).
54. GEORGE W.M. REYNOLDS, PICKWICK ABROAD OR THE TOUR IN
FRANCE (London, Thomas Tegg 1839).
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in book form in 1839. So, re-origination was alive and well, at least
for the time being.
C. The Time Machine
In keeping with the theme "everything old is new again," it
would be interesting to speculate on how the SunTrust/Houghton
Mifflin dispute would have been resolved had it been heard by ViceChancellor Shadwell in 1837 and how the Chapman and Hall dispute
would have fared in a U.S. federal court in the twenty-first century.
Although the analysis so far has focused on copyright, it must be
remembered that, in SunTrust, the plaintiff not only alleged
copyright infringement, but also a Lanham Act violation and
deceptive trade practice. 55 In Chapman & Hall, the prayer for
injunctive relief was based on fraud. 56 So I shall first address those
aspects of the two disputes and then turn to the central issue,
copyright infringement.
1. Fraud
As to allegations of fraud, Houghton Mifflin was better situated
factually than was the successful defendant Lloyd in the Pickwick
trial. Referring to the covers of the two Pickwicks, the ViceChancellor stated, "no person who had ever seen the original could
imagine the other to be anything else than a counterfeit." 5 7 The dust
covers of Gone with the Wind and The Wind Done Gone are even
more dissimilar in artwork. As to the similarity between the titles,
The Posthumous Papers and The Post-Humorous Notes, the ViceChancellor dismissed the similarity, stating "there was nothing by
which the two publications could be connected, except merely the
words 'Pickwick' and 'Boz'." 58 How less likely is it that he would
have found a connection between the two works in SunTrust? After
all, Lloyd used "Bos" as the editor, whereas Randall used her own
name as author and not a name approximating that of Margaret
Mitchell. Furthermore, if Post-Humorous Notes of the Pickwickian
55. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2001).
56. Vice-Chancellor's Court, supra note 20 (reporting on trial of June 8,
1837).

57. Id.
58. Id.
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Club did not provide false connections to The Posthumous Papersof
the Pickwick Club, it is likely the Vice-Chancellor would have found
no connection between The Wind Done Gone and Gone with the
Wind. Lord Shadwell had said of the two works before him that
"[t]he two works were so exceedingly dissimilar, that nothing but the
grossest ignorance and unobservance on the part of persons intending
to purchase a work which had delighted'59the world for nearly a year
could allow them to purchase the other."
An expert in SunTrust had testified that The Wind Done Gone
"will not appeal to any desire among readers for a sequel to Gone
with the Wind... [because] the target audiences for the two books
are... very different. ' 6° So it is likely that, as he did with Pickwick,
the Vice-Chancellor would find The Wind Done Gone "exceedingly
dissimilar" from Gone with the Wind. Thus, as to fraud, Lord
Shadwell likely would have treated the defendant in SunTrust as he
had the defendant Lloyd.
What would be the fate of Lloyd if twenty-first century
American law were applied? The district court in SunTrust dealt
only with the copyright infringement issue and did
not deal with the
61
Lanham Act and deceptive trade practices claims.
With respect to the Lanham Act, Lloyd would face several
issues: (1) the title of his work; (2) the cover artwork; (3) the use of
"Bos" as editor and "Phis" as illustrator; (4) the use of disguised
character names; and (5) the use of Dickens' style.
The title, The Post-Humorous Notes, as it relates to the
continuing adventures of Pickwick, might not be a violation of the
Lanham Act under the rationale of Rogers v. Grimaldi.62 The cover
artwork in The Penny Pickwick is closer in design to the artwork in
Dickens' Pickwick than the artwork of The Wind Done Gone is to
that of Gone with the Wind. That said, the fact that The Penny
Pickwick is a parody of the original Pickwick may excuse the
resemblance under the reasoning of Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
59. Id.
60. SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1280 (alteration in original).
61. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357
(N.D. Ga. 2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).

62. 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Where a title with at least some
artistic relevance to the work is not explicitly misleading as to the content of
the work, it is not false advertising under the Lanham Act.").
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Doubleday Dell PublishingGroup, Inc.63 In Cliffs Notes, the court
concluded that:
[T]he parody cover of Spy Notes, although it surely
conjures up the original and goes to great lengths to use
some of the identical colors and aspects of the cover design
of Cliffs Notes, raises only a slight risk of consumer
confusion that is outweighed by the public interest in free
expression, especially in a form of expression that must to
some extent resemble the original.64
In 1837, Vice-Chancellor Shadwell held:
Looking at the outward covers of the two publications, no
person who had ever seen the original could imagine the
other to be anything else than a counterfeit, bearing no
resemblance to the thing it was intended to imitate. In his
opinion there was nothing whatever to lay hold of except
the mode in which the fancifully made word "Pickwick"
was formed, and which, it must be admitted, had some
resemblance to the name used in the plaintiffs work; but
even in this respect there was a considerable difference, one
being printed in a curved form, and the other in a strai[gh]t
line .... It therefore appeared to him there was nothing by
which the two publications could be connected, except
merely the words "Pickwick" and "Boz" which he
considered a very poor circumstance indeed.65
Thus, in light of Cliffs Notes, it seems likely a federal court today
would reach a similar conclusion.
The use of "Bos" (v. Dickens' "Boz") and "Phis" (v. Dickens'
"Phiz") is more problematic. The closeness of the spelling (and
pronunciation) would be more likely than the title to violate Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.66 (As Randall had used her own name as
author, she would, in contrast, not violate Section 43(a) in that
regard). If The Post-Humorous Notes were held to be a fair use
parody, as the Eleventh Circuit tentatively suggested The Wind Done
63. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
64. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).

65. Vice-Chancellor's Court, supra note 20 (reporting on the trial of
Chapman& Hall v. Lloyd on June 8, 1837).
66. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:21, 23:22 (4th ed. 2003).
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Gone was, 67 then like the use of disguised pseudonyms in The Wind
Done Gone,68 such use in The Post-Humorous Notes would likely

not be a violation of Section 43(a). 69
The Vice-Chancellor found "some sort of imitation in the style
of wit, as well as in the invention of words." 70 Style has been the
subject of Lanham Act protection, 7' but if the use of style was a part
of the parodic thrust then it might be found non-actionable. In
conclusion, the most problematic issue for Lloyd would be the use of
"Bos" and "Phis" under twenty-first century law, an issue that did
not, however, trouble the Vice-Chancellor in the nineteenth century.
2. Copyright infringement
Turning now to copyright, what would have been the likely fate
of a copyright infringement claim by SunTrust in Vice-Chancellor
Shadwell's court? First, if SunTrust's legal team had followed the
strategy Chapman and Hall's lawyers employed, they would not have
pleaded a count for copyright infringement. Assuming they alleged
67. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (1 lth
Cir. 2001) ("[B]ased upon our analysis of the fair use factors we find, at this
juncture, [The Wind Done Gone] is entitled to a fair use defense.") (emphasis

added)).
68. Note that the Eleventh Circuit held that the characters in Gone with the
Wind were copyrighted and copied in The Wind Done Gone: "While we agree
with Houghton Mifflin that the characters... taken from [Gone with the Wind]
are vested with a new significance... in [The Wind Done Gone], it does not
change the fact that they are the very same copyrighted characters." Id. at
1267. But the Eleventh Circuit, as noted above, concluded that, at that stage in
the litigation, The Wind Done Gone was entitled to a fair use defense. Id. at
1276.
69. See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497
(2d Cir. 1996) (Spa'am versus SPAM); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (Donkey Kong versus King Kong);
Universal City Studios v. Casey & Casey, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Fla.
1985), affid without opinion, 792 F.2d 1125 (1 lth Cir. 1986) (Miami Mice
versus Miami Vice); see also Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 654 F.2d 204

(2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the Greatest American Hero did not violate
copyright or Lanham Act § 43(a) rights of Superman). Professor J. Thomas
McCarthy has suggested that the "conjure up test" used in copyright parody
cases provides "some guidance for similar trademark cases." MCCARTHY,
supra note 66, § 31:156.
70. Vice-Chancellor's Court,supra note 20.

71. See, e.g., Romm Art Creations, Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp.
1126, 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the Lanham Act provides relief for a
claim of infringement with regard to art work).
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copyright infringement in addition to, or in lieu of, the fraud claim,
however, would the Vice-Chancellor have treated that allegation any
more favorably than he did the fraud claim in Pickwick? I would
suggest not. Gone with the Wind might be read as favoring the
traditions of the antebellum South, including the institution of
slavery. Though Dickens' pointed condemnation of slavery in the
United States in American Notes72 was not to be published until
some five years after the Pickwick litigation, the criticism reflected
the existing British attitude towards slavery. 73 The Post-Humorous
Notes may have been seen as a humorous criticism of Dickens' style
of storytelling, worthy of protection against a copyright infringement
claim, had one been made. As a matter of social conscience, an
attack on a novel that might be seen as glorifying slavery would be
more defensible than a mere lampoon of an elderly bachelor and his
innocent adventures. I would suggest that had The Wind Done
Gone-a re-origination of Gone with the Wind-been the subject of
litigation in the nineteenth century, the plaintiffs would not have
claimed copyright infringement, but if they had the claim would have
been unsuccessful before the Vice-Chancellor based on a reorigination defense.
If Chapman and Hall were teleported to twenty-first century
America and brought a copyright infringement action against Lloyd,
would they be successful or would they suffer the same fate as
SunTrust? Clearly, The Post-Humorous Notes of the Pickwickian
Club imitated The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club just as
The Wind Done Gone imitated Gone with the Wind. In a sense, both
The Post-Humorous Notes and The Wind Done Gone were
derivatives of the copied works. As the Eleventh Circuit stated,
referring to U.S. copyright law, "throughout the nineteenth century,
the copyright in literature was limited to the right [of an author] ...
only to prevent others from copying and selling her particular
literary work.",74 The court went on to say, however, that under "the
(Modem Library 1996) (1842).
73. In 1807, the English Parliament voted to outlaw the slave trade within
the British Empire. See An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, 47
72. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES

Geo. 3, c. 36, (Eng.). In 1833, it passed the Abolition of Slavery Act, 1833, 3

& 4 Will. 4, c. 73 (Eng.).
74. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11 th
Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citing Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201

(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514)).
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1909 Act, which codified the concept of a derivative work.., an
author's right to protect his original work against imitation was
established., 75 Thus, today The Post-Humorous Notes of the
Pickwickian Club would be considered a derivative work. To escape
liability, Lloyd-like Houghton Mifflin-would argue a fair use
defense. The concept of re-origination was sufficient in its day to
dissuade Chapman and Hall from even arguing copyright
infringement. Would the twenty-first century counterpart to reorigination-transformative use-save Lloyd from liability? As did
Randall, Lloyd also used a play on words in the title, suggesting this
derivative work was intended as a parody. Furthermore, Lloyd also
used readily recognized pseudonyms for the characters in his work.7 6
As did Randall, he copied some plot elements from the original but,
like Randall, created new plot elements and some characters not
found in the original. 77 Although The Post-Humorous Notes was
published for profit, that is balanced by what is arguably the
transformative nature of Lloyd's work. Finally, it should be noted
that, like The Wind Done Gone, The Post-HumorousNotes "were so
exceedingly dissimilar"78 from the copied work and, like The Wind
79
Done Gone, did "more than put a new gloss on the familiar tale."
So, Lloyd would likely escape liability in the twenty-first century, at
least as to a copyright infringement claim. Let us now return to the
nineteenth century.
D. Twilight of Re-origination
Richard Egan Lee, whose comments on re-origination were
quoted earlier, re-originated one time too many. In December 1843,
Dickens published A Christmas Carol, his Christmas gift to the
ages.
Dickens' story of Scrooge, Tiny Tim, and the other
wonderful characters who people this tale of redemption was an
instant success. 8 ' Lee, who analyzed, abridged and re-originated the
75. Id.
76. See supra Part II.A.
77. See id.

78. Vice-Chancellor's Court, supra note 20 (reporting on the trial of
Chapman & Hall v. Lloyd on June 8, 1837).

79. SunTrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1279.
80. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS
(1843).
81. E. JAQUES, CHARLES DICKENS

CAROL (WW

IN CHANCERY

Norton & Co. 2004)

5 (photo. Reprint 2001)
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works of Captain Marryat, Lytton and Byron, as well as Dickens,
published A Christmas Ghost Story, Re-originatedfrom the Original
by Charles Dickens Esquire and Analytically Condensed Expressly
82 Dickens immediately sought injunctive relief in
for This Work.
83
Chancery.
It is interesting to note Lee's re-origination defense. In his
affidavit, Lee admitted that:
[I]n the exercise of his usual avocations and in accordance
with the general custom of editors did critically examine the
plaintiffs last mentioned work. That the opinion and notes
of this Deponent resulting from such examination of the
plaintiffs said work were communicated by this Deponent
to his said coadjutor Henry Hewitt who proceeded to
analytically condense the said "Christmas Carol
abridge and
84
in Prose."
Lee went on in his affidavit to state that the title he selected, A
Christmas Ghost Story Reoriginatedfrom the Original by Charles
Dickens Esquire and Analytically Condensed Expressly for This
Work, expressed the fact "that very considerable improvements and
in some instances large original additions as well as condensation
had been effected., 85 Lee then went on to criticize Dickens' skill as
a writer:
That so far from the said Defendants' said publication being
...a colorable imitation of the plaintiff's said work... this
Deponent verily believes that numerous incongruities in the
plaintiffs work involving the unhinging of the whole story
or plot and some of which incongruities this Deponent had
(1914).
82. Id. at 73.
83. Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce heard Charles Dickens' application in
his court on January 7, 1844. On January 18, the Vice-Chancellor continued
Dickens' injunction against Lee who published a weekly literary work known
as Parley's Illuminated Library. Simonds, supra 22, at 129. Number 16
advertised A Christmas Ghost Story, Re-originated from the Original by
CharlesDickens Esquire and Analytically CondensedExpresslyfor This Work.
Id. The injunction was to restrain Lee from "publishing, selling, or otherwise

disposing of Number 16 ... or any continuation ... thereof." Id.

84. Affidavit of Richard Egan LeeSworn on January 16, 1844, reprinted in

supra note 81, at 72.
85. Id. at 73.

JAQUES,
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noted to the said Henry Hewitt ... [he] tastefully
remedied... 86
Serjeant 87 Thomas Noon Talfourd, Dickens' close personal
friend, represented him before Vice-Chancellor Sir J. Knight Bruce.
In what J.B. Richardson described as "the last English case on the
subject,, 88 the Vice-Chancellor sounded the death knell for unbridled
re-origination:
It is said that this is the case of an abridgement, and to be
protected. I am not at present aware that one man has a
right to abridge the work of another; nor do I mean to say
that there may not lawfully be an abridgement, or that an
abridgement would not be protected. How this may be, it is
not for me here and now to say; but I do say, that to assert
that one man has the right to abridge the work of another is
89
going beyond what I believe law to be.
The Christmas Carol re-origination may well have been the
"last English case on the subject," 90 but it was not the end of reorigination. 91 Dickens, however, chose not to pursue re-originators
again (though he later did bring suit against verbatim infringers). In
any event, the term re-origination ultimately faded into history. The
distorted use of the term to justify piracy probably led to its demise
as a term of art. Had the term not been co-opted by the likes of
Richard Egan Lee, it might have survived and found itself used today
in the analysis of "factor one" in a fair use determination. 92 In its
legitimate form it might arguably be considered an ancestor of
transformative use. Both theories looked to whether the copyist
added something of new value to the old work or whether the

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
The term serjeant was replaced by Q.C. (or K.C.).
RICHARDSON, supra note 21, at 107.
Dickens v. Berger, TIMES (London), Jan. 19, 1844, at 7 (emphasis

added).

90. RICHARDSON, supra note 21, at 107.
91. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 202 (K.B. 1769) (noting
that defendant asserted "a purchaser of every book or copy has a right to make
what use of it he pleases").
92. A fair use determination analysis requires determination of the purpose
and character of the allegedly infringing work. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 38:19

copying was simply
intended to supercede the original work, 93 as "a
94
mere evasion."
III. COPYRIGHT TERM LEGISLATION
A. Limited Times
Copyright legislation provisions for the term of protection
affords another opportunity to demonstrate "everything old is new
again." Part III of this article compares English legislation in
Dickens' time, particularly the Talfourd Act of 1842, to U.S.
legislation enacted little more than a century and a half later, the
Sonny Bono Act of 1998. Both acts dealt with an extension of the
term of copyright and both had their supporters and detractors. What
will be seen is how similar many of the arguments were despite
being separated by an ocean and more than one hundred and fifty
years.
Before addressing the two Acts in detail, it is appropriate to
review why copyright needed legislative extensions at all-why
copyright protection was not perpetual. The Constitution provides
that Congress shall have the power to secure "for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 95 One
might ask why the Constitution provided copyright protection for
only "limited times," rather than perpetual protection. Charles
Dickens, for one, thought copyright should be perpetual. He wrote in
his diary on February 5, 1839, "copyrights need be hereditary, for
genius isn't."96 In fact, little more than a century before his parents
married in 1809, there was a belief that copyright in works both
unpublished and published was a common law right to be enjoyed in
perpetuity. 97 But any common law right in published works ended
with the enactment of the Statute of Anne.
Generally acknowledged as the first copyright statute, the
Statute of Anne of 170998 provided a term of copyright of fourteen
93. Id.

94. Tonson v. Walker, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020 (Ch. 1752).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. Diary of Charles Dickens (1839) (on file with the Forster Collection at
the Victoria & Albert Museum in London).
97. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 202 (K.B. 1769).
98. Statute of Anne of 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (effective April 10, 1710).
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years, with a fourteen-year additional term if the author were alive at
the end of the first term, "and no longer."99 For works already
published at the time the Statute of Anne went into effect, a period of
twenty-one years of protection from that date was provided.' 0 0 (This
provision could well have served as a model when the 1976 Act
encompassed unpublished works that had hitherto enjoyed perpetual
protection under state law. The 1976 Act provided that the term of
protection under federal law for older unpublished words would not,
in any event, terminate prior to December 31, 2002-a period of
twenty-five years from the effective date of the 1976 Act, January 1,
1978). 1' English publishers took the admittedly self-serving
position that the Statute of Anne was protection in addition to, and
not in lieu of, common law protection, which they claimed was
perpetual. 0 2 The decision in 1769 in Millar v. Taylor seemed to
confirm the correctness of the publishers' position.'0 But, in 1774,
the House of Lords shattered the publishers' hopes.
A book entitled The Seasons led to the demise of common law
copyright of published works. At first, however, The Seasons
appeared to be the savior of that right. In 1729, Andrew Millar
published The Seasons.10 4 After the expiration of the statutory
copyright, Robert Taylor published a competing volume of The
Seasons. Millar sued him in King's Bench. 0 5 A divided court found
for Millar and, most importantly, held that the Statute of Anne had
not superceded the perpetual common law copyright. 10 6 The
10 7
copyright to The Seasons was transferred to Thomas Beckett.
When two Scottish booksellers, Alexander and John Donaldson,
brought out a "pirate" edition, Beckett sought and received an
injunction in Chancery. 08 The defendants appealed to the House of
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000).

102. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 158
(1968).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769) (citing unreported chancery cases).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 257.

PATTERSON, supra note 102, at 172.
108. See Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American
CopyrightLaw: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L.

REV. 1119, 1156 (1983).
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Lords. With the benefit of advisory opinions from a panel of judges
from the King's Bench, Exchequer and Common Pleas, the House of
Lords reversed the Decree of the Chancery court.1 °9 If there had
been a common law copyright in published works before0 the Statute
of Anne, Donaldson v. Beckett declared it was no more."
It is, perhaps, conjecture to assume that the decision in
Donaldson v. Beckett influenced the drafters of the U.S. Constitution
when they provided copyright protection for only "limited times,"
and the first Congress when it chose, as a limited time, a term
identical"' to that of the Statute of Anne, and like the House of
Lords in Donaldson v. Beckett left unpublished works to common
law protection. One can only wonder whether, if the House of Lords
had come out the opposite way in Donaldson v. Beckett, Article One,
Section Eight, Clause Eight of the Constitution might have come out
differently as to the term of protection. However, one thing is clear:
in England and the United States, copyright protection for published
works was not perpetual. That did not mean that the copyright term
was stagnant, however. It is time now to discuss the legislative
histories of the Talfourd Act and then the Sonny Bono Act before
turning to a comparison of the debates that led up to their respective
passage.
B. The TalfourdAct
When Charles Dickens was born on February 7, 1812, copyright
protection in England stood as it had in 1710, at fourteen years with a
fourteen-year renewal if, and only if, the author were still alive at the
end of the first fourteen-year term.' 12 If the author died before the
109. Id.
110. Professor Howard B. Abrams is of the opinion that the House of Lords
rejected "the notion of common law copyright." Id. at 1161; see also id. at
1139 (stating "the issue of common law copyright was not squarely passed
upon by a court until almost sixty years after the enactment of the Statute of
Anne," and thus, publishers sought to increase their protection in a time where
they had "lost their monopoly on printing and [were] faced with ever
increasing competition"). However, Abrams goes on to note that the language
of the Statute of Anne suggests that publishers did not believe that any
effective common law right existed. Id. at 1161-62.
111. The term was Fourteen years plus an additional fourteen years,
provided that the author was alive at the end of the first fourteen years.
[Copyright] Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.

112. Statute of Anne of 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).

Fall 2004]

DICKENS TO DIGITAL

end of the fourteen-year term, nothing was left but the balance of that
first fourteen-year period. On the other hand, authors who were
long-lived, might well outlive their copyrights, in some instances by
many years.
On December 16, 1812, a petition by the booksellers and
publishers of London and Westminster was presented in the House of
Commons. 113 One purpose of the petition was to relieve the
booksellers and publishers of the burden of providing so many gratis
copies of works to various libraries."14 More relevant to this
discussion was the second part of the petition, which lamented the
term of copyright provided by the Statute of Anne:
[T]hat, by the said act of queen Anne, the term of twentyeight years' copyright is secured to the author, and his
assigns, in case he should be alive at the end of the first
fourteen years, but, in case he should then be dead, the
copyright ceases at the end of the first fourteen years; and
the petitioners humbly submit that this distinction is, in
many cases, productive of great hardships to the families
of
5
principles."l
just
upon
authors, and is not founded
While most of the debate by the Commons centered on the issue of
the obligation to provide gratis copies of works to universities, one
member did address the term of copyright issue. Sir Samuel Romilly
made the point:
A man had a second period of 14 years in which he had an
interest in his work, if he survived the first 14 years; but, if
he died before the expiry of the first period, then his
executors had no farther interest in the work. It operated in
a way most injurious to the best interest of literature; for as
young authors were more likely to reach the second term
than old, it gave the immature and jejune compositions of
the former double the reward reserved for the productions
116
of ripened genius.

113. 24 PARE. DEB. (1st ser.) (1813) 308 (Eng.).

114. Id. at310.
115. Id. A similar petition was presented on behalf of the printers of London
and Westminster on March 1, 1813, 25 PAR. DEB. (1st ser.) (1813) 10 (Eng.),

and by Edinburgh booksellers on April 9, 1813, id. at 762.
116. 25 PARL. DEB. (lst ser.) (1813) 16 (Eng.).
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Apart from the remarks of Romilly, 117 the debate, such as it was,
was not focused on the term of copyright, and the term of copyright
was changed with no reported debate as to term. 1I8 At the tender age
of two, the future author of The Pickwick Papers and so many other
works would consequently enjoy a 9copyright term of twenty-eight
years or life, whichever was longer."
If the 1814 revision of the term of copyright was apparently
devoid of contention, the same may not be said with respect to the
next proposed revision, debated between 1837 and 1842.
On September 27, 1837, Charles Dickens dedicated the Pickwick
Papersto Serjeant Thomas Noon Talfourd:
MY DEAR SIR,

If I had not enjoyed the happiness of your private
friendship, I should still have dedicated this work to you, as
a slight and most inadequate acknowledgment of the
inestimable services you are rendering to the literature of
your country, and of the lasting benefits you will confer
upon the authors of this and succeeding generations, by
securing to them and their descendants a permanent interest
in the copyright of their works.
Many a fevered head and palsied hand will gather new
vigour in the hour of sickness and distress from your
117. "In consequence of the observations made by the distinguished and
learned individual to whom he had referred-in consequence of what had
fallen from Sir Samuel Romilly, the 54th George 3rd, was introduced,
extending copyright to the life of the author, and with this additional provision,
that instead of fixing a first period of fourteen years, and afterwards contingent
upon the life of the author, extending it to another fourteen years, it gave to the
author, at all events a clear and unconditional right of twenty-eight years." 63
PARL. DEB.

(3d ser.) (1841) 781 (Eng.).

118. See Act to Amend the Several Acts for the Encouragement of Learning,
by Securing the Copies and Copyright of Printed Books, to the Authors of
Such Books or Their Assigns, 54 Geo. 3, c. 156 (1814) (Eng.).
119. Id. The United States did not amend its copyright law in regard to term

until 1831, when it extended the first term to twenty-eight years with the

additional fourteen years, available to the author, or if the author be deceased,
to the surviving widow or children. [Copyright] Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4
Stat. 436. Thus, the total possible U.S. term was forty-two years whereas the

English term was twenty-eight years or life. Assuming an average life span,

the American term was clearly more advantageous as to works written towards
the end of one's life and the English system more advantageous with respect to
works written earlier in a career, at least for a long-lived author.
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excellent exertions; many a widowed mother and orphan
child, who would otherwise reap nothing from the fame of
departed genius but its too frequent legacy of poverty and
suffering, will bear, in their altered condition, higher
most lavish
testimony to the value of your labours than the
20
1
afford.
ever
could
pen
or
lip
encomiums from
What services was Serjeant Talfourd rendering to the literature of his
country? Talfourd, a barrister and author, was also a member of
Parliament. On Thursday, May 18, 1837, he introduced a Bill to
amend the law of copyright. 12 1 The main purpose of the Bill was to
extend the term of copyright. Referring to the common law
perpetual copyright, Talfourd stated, "[t]he claim of the author to
perpetual copyright was never disputed, until literature had received
afatal present in the first act of Parliament for its encouragementthe 8th Anne, c. 19, passed in 1709. ' ' 122 Like Romilly some twentyfour years before him, he reminded Parliament of the unfair
consequences of too short a term of copyright. "It denies to age and
experience the probable reward it permits to youth."' 123 He went on
to state that once copyright was terminated, anyone was free "to
emasculate, and to garble."' 124 Talfourd noted that he would have
preferred that authors be restored to the common law protection they
enjoyed before the Statute of Anne, but that "the subject.. . [had for]
so long been treated as a matter of compromise" that he proposed
still to treat it on the principles of compromise. 125 So Talfourd
proposed that the term "be extended to sixty years, to be computed
from the death of the author."' 126 So, while Dickens' dedication of
The Pickwick Papers referred to "a permanent interest in the
copyright,"' 127 Talfourd actually only sought a term that would
protect descendants for a limited time. Leave was given to bring in
120. DICKENS, supra note 7, at xxii (emphasis added).
121. 38 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1837) 866 (Eng.).
122. Id. at 868 (emphasis added). Talfourd went on to emphasize the point:
"[T]he term of twenty-eight years, with the possible reversion beyond that time
for life, is all authors have yet obtained in return for that inheritance of which
the Statute of Anne deprived them." Id. at 871.
123. Id. at 875.
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id. at 873.
126. Id.
127. DICKENS, supra note 7, at xxii.
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the Bill, but "the demise of the Crown closed the Session and
stopped its progress."' 28 Had King William IV not died on June 20,
1837, the Bill might have passed in the twelfth Parliament.
On December 14, 1837, Talfourd was given leave in the first
session of the thirteenth Parliament to bring another Bill "in
substance similar to that ...in the last session."' 129 Talfourd's Bill
met with strong opposition from publishers, printers, booksellers and
others connected with the publishing trade. 130 Talfourd ultimately
decided to withdraw it. 131 He introduced the Bill for a third time in
the second session of Parliament. Faced with "the opposition with
which the bill was threatened," on July 9, 1839, Talfourd moved that
the Bill be put off to the next session. 132 On February 4, 1840, he
introduced the Bill for the fourth time. 133 On July 8, 1840, Talfourd
concluded that the Bill had "little chance.., of getting. . . passed in
the present Session," and moved for its discharge. 134 But Talfourd
was, if anything, extraordinarily tenacious. He would try again.
On Wednesday, January 27, 1841, Sergeant Talfourd sought to
introduce yet another Bill. 35 The Bill again was vigorously
opposed.136 Leave was given on a divided vote, however, to bring
the Bill. 137 In debate over the motion to have the Bill read a second
time, Talfourd indicated for the first time that as to the sixty-year
term after death, "he was not by any means wedded to that term, but
that a less term would satisfy him."' 38 He mentioned a thirty-year
term being discussed in Paris. 139 This retreat from the sixty-year
term availed him nothing. Thomas Babington Macaulay spoke at
length in opposition to the Bill, and his oratory carried the day. 140 A
second reading of the Bill was defeated on February 5, 1841.141
128. 45 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 921 (Eng.).

129. 39 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 1091 (Eng.).
130. See 45 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 922 (Eng.).

131. Id.
132. 49 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 72-73 (Eng.).
133. 51 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 1250-58 (Eng.).
134. 55 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 557 (Eng.).
135. 56 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1841) 134 (Eng.).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 360.
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Talfourd thought that "he had been defeated merely by an accident,
and not by any argument that had been brought forward against
him." 142 Moreover, Talford "had no doubt that the result would be
different when he brought forward the measure next Session."' 143 He
was defeated, however, in his bid for re-election as the Member of
Parliament from Reading.
Talfourd was now on the sidelines, but revision of the copyright
term was not a dead issue. On March 3, 1842, in the second session
of the fourteenth Parliament, Talfourd's ally on copyright revision,
Viscount Mahon, moved leave to bring a Bill, but it was a much
reduced amendment than that sought by Talfourd. 144 Mahon's Bill
would provide a period of twenty-five years after the death of an
author,R 5 but in any event not less than twenty-eight years
absolutely. 146 The proposed Bill also provided for works published
after the death of the author to have a term of thirty years from the
first publication. 147 Mahon noted that publishers, printers and
stationers who first opposed the measure now expressed themselves
in favor.148 Macaulay countered with a suggestion of a fixed term of
forty-two years 149 or life, whichever was longer. 150 Another member
suggested a compromise between the proposals of Mahon and
Macaulay, at forty-two years certain with a seven-year post-mortem
term.' 51 The House of Commons, by a divided vote, adopted the
term of life plus seven years or forty-two years, whichever was
Interestingly, the version was made applicable to
longer. 152
142. Id. at 502.
143. Id.
144. 60 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1429 (Eng.).
145. Id. Mahon also proposed to give power to a committee of the Privy
Council to prevent suppression of works by representatives of a deceased
author. Id.
146. 61 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1356 (Eng.).
147. Id. at 1391.
148. Id. at 1362-63.
149. This was roughly analogous to the twenty-eight years plus fourteen year
renewal term of the U.S. 1831 copyright law. See [Copyright] Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch.16, 4 Stat. 436. The U.S. Act of 1831, however, conditioned the
additional fourteen years on the author, spouse or children being alive at the
end of the twenty-eight year term, whereas Macaulay's forty-two year term
was not so conditioned. Id.; 61 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1364 (Eng.).
150. 61 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1364 (Eng.).
151. Id. at 1394.
152. Id. at 1400-02.
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subsisting copyright "except when it shall belong to an assignee for
other consideration than natural love and affection: in which case it
shall cease at the expiration of the present term, unless its extension
153
shall be agreed to between the proprietor and author."'
The Bill passed the House of Commons on April 26, 1842.154
Next the House of Lords considered it. The House of Lords debated
the proposed extension of the term and the retroactive provision.
The latter received particular attention because it affected publishers
who went to press expecting that certain works would shortly be in
the public domain under the provisions of the 1814 Act. 155 On
Friday, June 24, 1842, the House of Lords passed the Bill. 156 The
statute became effective on July 1, 1842.157 It had taken five years
and lengthy, at times acrimonious, debate in the House of Commons
to extend the term of copyright.
What had been gained? Certainly not perpetual or hereditary
copyright as Dickens desired. Certainly not a term of sixty years
after the death of the author as Talfourd had originally proposed. On
the other hand, the law did increase the guaranteed aspect of the term
from twenty-eight to forty-two years. The seven years of post
mortem protection was nominal, though little more than a tenth of
what Talfourd sought. The retroactive provision did provide a
significant benefit, however, for authors who owned their copyrights.
Even where they did not, the publisher who wished to enjoy the
benefit of the term extension would have to negotiate with the author
or the author's heirs. 158 In addition, the Bill finally provided a fortytwo-year term for a post-death publication, close to Talfourd's
goal. 159 Dickens himself, disappointed as he must have been that the
term was not at least as long as that proposed by Talfourd,
nonetheless benefited from it, as all of his works were still under
copyright under the 1814 Act and would enjoy the retroactive
extension.

153. Id. at 1402.
154.
155.
156.
157.

62 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1110 (Eng.).

See 63 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 784-85 (Eng.).

64 PARE. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 538 (Eng.).
Talfourd's Act (An Act to Amend the Law of Copyright), 1842, 5 & 6

Vict., c. 45 (Eng.).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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C. The Sonny Bono Act

The Talfourd Act was five contentious years in the making. By
comparison, the Sonny Bono Act took but three years to become law
and might have been enacted even earlier but for the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act, which had been tied to its tail.' 60 Moreover,
while there was opposition to the Sonny Bono Act, it came primarily
from the legal academy and not from members of Congress.1

On October 29, 1993, the European Union issued a directive to
its member states to harmonize their copyright laws by adopting a
term of protection equal to the life of the author plus seventy
years. 62 That decision would ultimately lead to the passage of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998.163 Congress
first acted with respect to adding twenty years to the term of
copyright protection with the introduction of S. 483, Copyright Term
Extension Act, on March 2, 1995, and reported to the Senate on July

160. Congressman Conyers stated that those who espoused the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act had "kidnapped term extension and used it as a hostage."
144 CONG. REC. E2308 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998). Congressman Doggett
referred to the Act as the "Music Theft Act." 144 CONG. REC. H1457 (daily
ed. Mar. 25, 1998). Congressman McCollum commented, "We have been
waiting around for quite a long time.., to get this Bill to the floor of the
House, simply because there has been this big dispute between the restaurants
of this country... and the songwriters." 144 CONG. REC. H1462 (daily ed.
Mar. 25, 1998). And, most appropriately, given the theme of this article,
Senator Thompson, lamenting the inclusion of Fairness in Music Licensing as
Title II of Senate Bill 505, remarked, "As Charles Dickens might say, it is the
best of times and the worst of times for those who create the property that is
protected by copyright." 144 CONG. REC. S12,434 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Thompson) (emphasis added).
161. See Lawrence Lessig, Lecture: Copyright's First Amendment, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1057, 1067-68 (2001) ("[N]o member of [C]ongress had the
courage to question this [copyright term] extension-but law professors...
testified against the action ....).

162. Council Directive 93/98 of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9.
163. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (describing the 1993
European Union directive extending copyright terms as a "key factor" in
Congress's adoption of the Copyright Term Extension Act); 144 CONG. REC.
S12,377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing if United
States copyright laws "do not keep pace with ...the EU Directive, American
works will fall into the public domain 20 years before those of our European
trading partners, undercutting our international trading position and depriving
copyright owners of two decades of income ").
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10, 1996 as the Copyright Term Extension Act of 19 9 6 . 64 That Bill
died with the end of the 104th Congress. The Senate passed S. 505,
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, on October 7, 1998, and
renamed it the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in honor
of the late congressman.' 65 That same day the bill was passed by the
House. The president signed the bill on October 27, 1998.166
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act added twenty
years to the term of copyright. 1 67 Thus, life plus fifty became life
plus seventy. For works for hire, -anonymous and pseudonymous
works, the term changed from the lesser of 100 years from creation
or seventy-five years from publication to the lesser of 120 years from
creation or ninety-five years. from publication. 168 In addition,
Congress increased the second term of copyright for works published
prior to 1978 from forty-seven years to sixty-seven years. Thus,
works published as early as 1923 and for which renewal had been
obtained were protected for a total of ninety-five years. Finally,
unpublished works were protected for the life of the author plus
seventy years, with a term for older works that would not end before
December 31, 2002; works published by that date would enjoy a
term ending December 31, 2047.169
D. The Debates
1. The Differences
There was one very significant difference between the debate
that preceded the enactment of the Sonny Bono Act and the one that
preceded the Talfourd Act: the dissent to the Sonny Bono Act was
limited and unsuccessful, whereas the opposition to Talfourd's
proposal was, not to understate, vigorous and to a degree successful.
Talfourd's Act was less than its namesake hoped for. This is not to
say there was not opposition to the Sonny Bono Act; there was-but
mainly from outside the Congress itself.170 The reason there was not
164. S.483, 104th Cong. (1996).
165. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. 1,
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-305), 112 Stat. 2827, 2834 (1998).
166. Id.
167. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
168. Id.
169. Id. § 303.
170. See supra note 161.
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as vigorous a dissent in Congress in the late twentieth century as
there had been in the Parliament in the nineteenth century lies in the
differences between the two economies. Nineteenth century England
had an industry-based, goods economy.' 7 ' Intellectual property was
not then a source of significant revenue, at least not international
revenue.172 In contrast, the late twentieth/early twenty-first century
U.S. economy has been driven in large measure by intellectual
property. 173 Congressman Howard Coble summed it up best: "Our
most valuable economic resource is no longer our industrial power
and natural resources, but the creative potential of the minds of our
citizens."' 74 The Senate report accompanying the 1996 term
extension bill emphasized the importance of intellectual property to
the U.S. economy:
America exports more copyrighted intellectual property
than any country in the world, a huge percentage of it to
nations of the European Union. In fact, in 1996, the core
U.S. copyright industries achieved foreign sales and exports
exceeding $60 billion, surpassing, for the first time, every
other export sector, including automotive, agriculture and
aircraft.... In fact, in 1996, the total copyright industries
leading noncopyright
employed more workers than the four
75
combined.
sectors
manufacturing
The economies of nineteenth century England and
twenty/twenty-first century America were very different. The
technology for exploiting copyrighted works had gone from printing
and live performances to phonorecords, motion pictures, radio
television, and the Internet. Even so, as shown below, the debate
about the Sonny Bono Act was in many ways an echo of the debate
over the Talfourd Act as shown below.
Both the dialogue that led up to the Bono Act and that which led
171. See CRAFTS, BRITISH ECONOMIC GROWTH DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 57 (1985); CLIVE H. LEE, THE BRITISH ECONOMY SINCE 1700: A
MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3-23 (1986); N.F.R; BRIAN R. MITCHELL,
ABSTRACT OF BRITISH HISTORICAL STATISTICS 366 (1962).

172. See CRAFTS supra note 171.
173. Copyright Term Extension Act, 144 CONG. REC. H1458 (daily ed. Mar.
25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble).
174. Id.
175. 144 CONG. REC. S12,377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 38:19

up to the Talfourd Act included a patriotic call to arms. In 1998,
Senator Kennedy stated, "Effective copyright protection is an
important national priority. If the United States is to continue its
leadership in [the] world of ideas and creativity, we must continue to
provide a climate that encourages America's authors, artists,
' 76
inventors and composers and the important work that they do."'
Little more than a century and a half earlier, Viscount Mahon had
said, "I should say let England take the lead; let it not
be said that in
' 77
so noble a work Englishmen alone were backward."'
The comparison of the debates that preceded the enactments of
the Talfourd Act and the Sonny Bono Act reveals a number of
themes: (1) the desirability of extending the term of copyright as an
incentive to creativity; (2) the proposed term extension's effect on
the price to the consumer; (3) the possibility of censorship by the
heirs of authors; and (4) the desirability of a retroactive application
of term extension.
2. Term Extension as an Incentive to Creativity
a. PRO-The proponents of term extension argued that it was not
enough to grant copyright to an author during the author's lifetime,
but that the copyright term should also benefit the family of a
deceased author.
Certainly one of the reasons why people exert themselves to
earn money or acquire property is to leave a legacy to their
children and grandchildren. Whatever the reason, the
inescapable conclusion must be drawn that copyrights in
valuable works are too often expiring before they have
served their purpose of allowing
any author to pass their
78
benefits on to his or her heirs.'
-Senator Hatch, 1995

176. 144 CONG. REc. S 11,673 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
177. 61 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1361 (Eng.).
178. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: HearingBefore the S. Comm.

on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2-3 (1995) [hereinafter HearingBefore the S.
of Sen. Hatch).

JudiciaryComm.] (statement
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[Wihile providing for the instruction and the delight of
distant ages, to contemplate that he shall leave in his works
themselves some legacy to thosefor whom a nearer, if not a
to provide, and which shall make
higher duty, requires him
79
"death less terrible."1

-Talfourd,

1837

[T]he primary purpose of a proprietary interest in
copyrighted works that is descendible from authors to their
children and even grandchildren is to form a strong creative
of knowledge and culture in
incentive for the advancement
0
the United States.18

-Senate

Report, 1996

Believe me the report of your proceedings to-night will be
watched with deep anxiety by many a mother sorrowingfor
the futurefortunes of her children, by many a writer whose
eye-sight perhaps hasfailed in long laboursfor the cause of
knowledge, and whose declining years are saddled by the
thought that his works-the labours of his life-are all he
can bequeath to those he loves, and that even those works
you will not allow him to call his own. This is no imaginary
picture-even to the remotest districts of the kingdom-even
among the hills of Cumberland-will your decision of tonight be most anxiously awaited."'
-Viscount Mahon, 1840
When, however, we so often see copyrights expiring before
even the first generation of an author's heirs have fully
benefited from them, then I believe it is accurate to say that
our term of copyright is too short and for too limited a
time. 182

-Senator

179. 38

PARL. DEB.

Hatch, 1995

(3d ser.) (1837) 873 (Eng.).

180. S. REP.NO. 104-315, at 11 (1996).
181. 52PARL.DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 413 (Eng.).
182. HearingBefore the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 178.
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What could be more monstrous than... [a] man possessing
a revenue arisingfrom works of great learning,of which he
was the author,... by which he was enabled to support his
family in comfort and respectability,... finding]... at the

very moment of death, as soon as his eyes were closed, that
the doors of his house would be forced open, his family
driven from its shelter, and his effects seized by strangers
83
and distributedamongst the public.1
-Lord

Chancellor, 1842

The observation was also made, both in the twentieth century
and the nineteenth century, that not all authors are blessed with
economic independence:
What we are saying is, we want to encourage creativity, not
simply as a hobby, not simply as something that people who
are independently wealthy can do on their own time, but as
a way for people to earn a living to support themselves and
84
their families.'

-Congressman

Frank, 1998

He found himself born to an inheritance of wealth, and he
found at the same time with pain, that others, who were far
superior to him in merit, industry, and reputation, were far
below him in the accidental gifts offortune-he found men,
who were an honour to their country, subject to wants and
privations which such merit ought never to have known.
The object then of the Bill was this, to give these eminent
men full scope for their talents, and to enable them, by their
own exertion, to obtain that competency which he and
185
otherspossessed, without any merit of their own.
-Viscount

Mahon, 1840

183. 63 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 782 (Eng.).
184. 144 CONG. REc. H1,459 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Frank).
185. 52 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 406 (Eng.).
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Proponents also personalized the arguments by reference to
authors of their day:
[T]he famous American composer Irving Berlin, who wrote
such famous musical works as 'A Pretty Girl is Like a
Melody,' 'What I Will Do,' [sic] and 'Alexander's Rag
Time Band,' began publishing in 1907, and died in 1989, at
an age of 101. Not only did he survive the 75-year fixed
term of protection in some of his own works, even for his
most famous works, his heirs will benefit from only a few
years of protection. In an increasing number of cases,
widows and widowers of American authors are outliving
the 75-year term of copyright protection in their spouses'
works.'

86

-Senate

Report, 1996

It is unjust in this case, which is that of Wordsworth now in
the evening of life, and in the dawn of his fame, to allow the
to share in the remuneration society tardily awards
author
187
him?

-Talfourd,

1838

186. S. REP. No. 104-315, at 10-11 (1996). One of Berlin's daughters
submitted her own written statement: "Because of my father's long life and
young beginnings, his songs-most notably 'Alexander's Ragtime Band'began falling into the public domain more than a decade ago, before he himself
died. At that time his daughters were in their forties and fifties and his

grandchildren (all but one) in their teens and twenties. Every year now more
of those songs he hoped to leave as a legacy to those children and

grandchildren become public property." Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and
Film PreservationLegislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 272
(1995) [hereinafter Hearing Before House Judiciary Comm.] (statement of

Mary Ellin Barrett, daughter of Irving Berlin).
187. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 559 (Eng.). As Talfourd recounted, Mr.
Wordsworth filed his own petition with the House of Commons:
Mr. Wordsworth states that he is on the point of attaining his 70th
year; that 46 years ago he published his first work, and that he has
continued to publish original works at various intervals down to 1835.

The copyright in a considerable part of these works is now contingent

on his life; in a few years the far larger portion will be holden by the
same tenure; and a most extensive and elaborate work, The Excursion,
will be in this condition, if he should be spared for four years longer.
He represents, that 'having engaged and persevered in literary labours,
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The reference to the situation of particular authors gave rise to
criticism from the opponents of term extension:
We do not recognize new intellectual property rights, or
strengthen old ones, simply because it appears that a worthy
person may benefit; rather, we do so only for a public
purpose and where it appears that there will be a public
88
benefit. 1
-Professor

Karjala, 1995

Members had been roused and enlisted on behalfof one or
two destitute authors, that the, House would be anxious to
inquire in what respect a new Act of Parliamentshould be
framedfor the purpose of extending the period of copyright
from what it now was.'189
-Mr. Wakely, 1840
Serjeant Talfourd's reply seems equally responsive, not only to
the criticism of 1840, but to that of 1995 as well:
[A]lthough I agree that we ought not to legislatefor these
cases, I contend that we ought to legislate by the light of
their examples. 190

less with the expectation of producing speedy effect than with a view
to interest and benefit mankind remotely though permanently, his
works, though never out of demand, have made their way slowly into
general circulation;' and he states as a fact directly bearing on this
question, that his works have, within the last four years, brought a
larger emolument than in all his preceding life, which would now be
bounded by his death ....
45 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 928.

188. Hearing Before House Judiciary Comm., supra note 186, at 294-95

(statement of Dennis S. Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University,
on behalf of the U.S. copyright and intellectual law professors).
189. 51 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 1251 (Eng.).
190. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 567 (Eng.).
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b. CON-Those who opposed term extension argued that there
was no evidence that the then existing term was insufficient to
encourage creativity.
[T]here is no evidence that the current monopoly grant of
life-plus-50 years is an insufficient incentive. There is
nothing in the hearing record that suggests extending the
term will result in more works or higher quality
copyright
9
works. ' '
-Senator Brown, 1996
There was only one question to be asked. Was the present
term of copyright sufficient effectually to secure to an
author himself the benefit which he ought to derivefrom the
exercise of his talents? If so, then why extend it? It might
be a pleasing thing to contemplate the extension of the
benefit to the posterity of an author. But it was impossible
so to extend it92without doing a great and manifest injustice
to the public. 1
-The Solicitor General, 1838
It does not follow that a longer term automatically drives
creative authors to work harder or longer to produce works
that can be enjoyed by the public. Indeed, there is
necessarily a type of diminishing return associated with an
ever-longer protection period, because the193benefit to the
author must be discounted to present value.
-Professor

Karjala, 1995

The question, therefore, arose with double force, whether
the privilege at present enjoyed by authors was not
sufficient to induce them to employ their talents. He did not
think that the hon. and learned Member had succeeded in
establishing the position that it was not sufficient; and on
191. S. REP. No. 104-315, at 32 (1996) (minority view of Sen. Brown).
192. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 570 (Eng.).
193. Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., supra note 186, at 299
(statement of Dennis S. Karijala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University,
on behalf of the U.S. copyright and intellectual law professors).

54
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that ground,principally, he (Mr..Hume) was opposed to the
Bill. If the principlescontainedin the petition which he had
that night presented against the Bill, were correct, it would
be for the House to consider whether the present limitation
of copyright to twenty-eight years was insufficient; and
whether it would be wise or expedient to extend the
durationof the copyright to fifty years, or more.194
-Mr. Hume, 1838
If the proponents of term extension could employ the examples
of individual authors, so could the opponents:
Do you know any creator that would fail to create if the
monopoly grant ran out at life-plus-50 years of protection
rather than life-plus-70 years? Would Hemingway have
produced another work if he were guaranteed another 20
years of copyright protection? Would Wyeth
have painted
95
more? Would Sinatra have sang more? 1
-Senator

Brown, 1996

Dr. Johnson died fifty-six years ago ....
Now, would the
knowledge, that this copyright would exist in 1841, have
been a source of gratification to Johnson? Would it have
stimulated his exertions? Would it have once drawn him
out of his bed before noon? Would it have once cheered
him under afit of the spleen? Would it have induced him to
give us one more allegory, one more life of a poet, one more
196
imitation of Juvenal?
-Mr. Macaulay, 1841

194. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 568 (Eng.).
195. S. REP. No. 104-315, at 32 (1996) (minority view of Sen. Brown).
196. 56 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1841) 349-50 (Eng.).
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3. Prices Are Lower for Works Under Copyright
a. PRO-The proponents of term extension argued that prices for
works under copyright were lower than for works in the public
domain.
This is Moby Dick, written by Herman Melville in 1851.
This book went into the public domain over 100 years ago.
This is The Chamber, written by John Grishman [sic] in
1994. The price of Moby Dick is twelve dollars and ninetyfive cents. 97
The price of The Chamber is seven dollars and
fifty cents.'
-Mr. Menken, 1995
If they took the works of Scott, Byron, Southey,
Wordsworth, and he might add the works of a relation of
his own, and compared the price obtainedfor them with the
price chargedby the tradefor the works of Hume, Johnson,
Burke, and other authors of the last age, they would find
that the public obtained the works of the former at a far
cheaper rate than those of the latter authors, who had all
been deadfor many years.198
-Mr. D'Israeli, 1838
In theory, at least, opponents of copyright extension are
correct to observe that the price charged consumers for a
work will be higher if copyright subsists in the work than if
the work is in the public domain. But theory does not
always prove true in practice, and it is entirely plausible that

197. Hearing Before the S. Judicary Comm., supra note 178, at 54
(statement of Alan Menken).
198. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 577 (Eng.).
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the exploitation of public domain works will result in
comparable, or even higher, prices to consumers.200
-Professor Goldstein, 1995
Had books become cheaper or dearersince the extension of
the copyright in 1814? Was it not within the knowledge of
every individual,that books had become cheaper since that
time, were daily becoming cheaper, and thus becoming
more accessible to the mass of mankind. It was the interest
of the persons who published, whether he were an200author or
a bookseller, to print the books in a cheap shape.
-Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1839
b. CON-The opponents of term extension argued to the contrary,
that, in fact, works in the public domain were sold at lower prices
than works under copyright.
The direct economic costs of a 20-year-longer period of
protection, although difficult to calculate precisely, includes
higher cost to the consuming public for works that would
otherwise be in the public domain. That these costs are
substantial is shown by the very claims of the proponents of
this legislation that they will miss out on the European
20
windfall if we do not extend our term to that of Europe.
-Professor

Karjala, 1995

If Gentlemen who supported the measure would show him
that he was in error-ifthey would show him that printing
a
under a copyright would be cheaper than printingwithout
202
copyright, his opposition to the Bill would be withdrawn.
-Mr. Grote, 1838

199. Letter from Paul Goldstein, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to
Jack J. Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America 3-4 (June
28, 1995), in HearingBefore House JudiciaryComm., supra note 186, at 58384.
200. 45 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 941.

201. Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., supra note 186, at 296
(statement of Dennis S. Karjala).
202. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 585 (Eng.).
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[T]he only reasonable conclusion is that the increased term
would impose a heavy cost on the public-in the form of
higher royalties and an impoverished public domainwithout any countervailing public
benefit in the form of
2 3
increased authorship incentives. 0
-Law

School Professors, 1995

He held in his hand a statement by which it appeared that
during the last year of the existence of the copyright of Sir
Walter Scott's 'Lay of the last Minstrel,' that work was sold
at two guineas; but that in the year after the expiration of
the copyright it was published at five shillings; and in the
subsequent year at eighteenpence! The same was the case
with respect to "Marmion.' It was originallypublished at a
guinea and a half After the expiration of the copyright it
was published at five shillings; and more recently at
tenpence! Was not that diminution of price a great
advantage to the public-an advantage which ought not to
be relinquished unless on very good grounds?... Why,
without being desired to do so, agree to a measure
calculated to produce a great evil-that of increasing the
price of books ?204
-Mr.

Hume, 1838

4. Works Under Copyright Are Not Censored by Successors in
Interest
a. PRO-The proponents of term extension argued that an author's
successors in interest were not likely to prevent publication of the
author's works.
Copyright owners are generally interested in exploiting
their works for money.
Despite isolated anecdotes,
situations where authors or their families seek to deny
public access to works are unusual. They will be even less
203. HearingBefore S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 178, at 149 (statement

of various law school professors).
204. 42 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 569 (Eng.).
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frequent during the extended term, more than 50 years after
the author's death; strong personal 20feelings
about a work's
5
time.
over
diminish
to
tend
contents
-Professor Perlmutter, 1995
It had been brought forward as an argument, that the
measure would put it in the power of an individual to refuse
the publication of a work calculated to amuse or to instruct
the people, that it would give authors the power of
withholding from the public works calculated to improve
and to elevate the mind, and to promote the happiness and
prosperity of the country ....
In legislating on this
importantsubject, they had no right to suppose, that such a
difficulty would have to be encountered; but, on the
contrary, they were bound to suppose, that a man in the
possession ofproperty would wish to make the bestpossible
use of it, so as to reap from it the greatest possible
0 6
advantage.2

-Mr. D'Israeli, 1838
b. CON-The opponents of term extension argued that successors in
interest might withhold publication where they disagreed with the
author's sentiments.
The rights of the copyright owner include not only the right
to profit from the exploitation of the work, but also the right
to withhold that work, even where a profit could be earned
from its exploitation. Sometimes, it is rational for the
copyright owner to withhold permission because the new
exposure of an old work might interfere with the market
prospects of a new one.
Sometimes, however, copyright owners refuse to license
their works-even those which have little, current
205. Memorandum from Shira Perlmutter, Professor of Law, Catholic
University of America, to Jack J. Valenti, President, Motion Picture

Association of America 12 (July 10, 1995), in HearingBefore House Judiciary
Comm., supra note 186, at 598.

206. 42

PARL. DEB.

(3d ser.) (1838) 576 (Eng.).
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commercial value-for other, non-economic reasons. It is
in the very nature of copyright that during its limited term,
it is a charter for 'private censorship,' and copyright owners
routinely exercise the authority the law gives them to
content of the uses other[s] make of their
control the
20 7
works.
-Professor Jaszi, 1995
The heirs of an author might entertain opinions,political or
religious, opposed to those maintained in his work, and
might, in consequence, think it advisable that the work
should be suppressed,and in the result, the public would be
deprived of the work altogether. He would suppose the
case of the prose works of Milton coming into the hands of
a person who differed with the writer's opinions respecting
the royal cause during the civil war. Would any man
contend, that the public would not have had great andjust
cause for complaint, had they been suppressed in
consequence ofsuch a circumstance?208
-Lord John Russell, 1838
While primary control over the work, including the rights to
refuse publication or republication and to create derivative
works, properly remains in the author who has created it,
giving such control to distant descendants of the author can
deprive the public of creative new works based on the
Artistic freedom to make
copyright-protected work.
creative derivative works based on public domain works is
a significant public benefit, as shown by musical plays like
Les Miserables, Jesus Christ Superstar, and West Side
Story, as well as satires like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern
are Dead and even literary classics like James Joyce's
Ulysses .... Authors of histories and biographies can also
be inhibited from presenting independent analyses of earlier
authors and their works by descendants who, for whatever
207. HearingBefore S. JudiciaryComm., supra note 178, at 76 (statement of
Peter A. Jaszi).
208. 43 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1838) 557 (Eng.).
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personal reason, use copyright to prevent the publication of
portions of protected works.2 °9
-Professor Karjala, 1995
I think it right, Sir, to call the attention of the House to an
evil, which is perhaps more to be apprehended when an
author's copyright remains in the hands of his family, than
when it is transferredto booksellers. I seriouslyfear, that if
such a measure as this should be adopted, many valuable
works will be either totally suppressed or grievously
mutilated .... Most of us, I am sure, have known persons
who, very erroneously, as I think, but from the best motives,
would not choose to reprint Fielding'snovels, or Gibbon 's
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
Some Gentlemen may perhaps be of opinion, that it would
be as well 0if Tom Jones and Gibbon 's History were never
21
reprinted.
-Mr. Macaulay, 1841
5. Authors Should Enjoy the Term Extension for Already-Published
Works Still Under Copyright
a. PRO-The proponents of term extension argued that retroactive
protection would enhance the possibility that the quality of copies of
works would be maintained and continued distribution assured.
The public will benefit in another meaningful respect from
the extension of term for... existing.., works. During the
extra 20 years, copyright owners will have a greater
incentive to take whatever steps may be necessary to
disseminate their works in high-quality form if they can
retain control over reproduction and distribution, and
211
exclude free riders from the market.
-Professor Perlmutter, 1995

209. HearingBefore S. JudiciaryComm., supra note 178, at 82 (statement of
Dennis S. Karjala).
210. 56 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1841) 353 (Eng.).
211. Memorandum from Shira Perlmutter, supra note 205, at 593.
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[T]ake any of the standard works of our literature at
present out of print, and selling at a high price in the
market. Why selling at a high price? Because nobody
would venture to republish them. Every man said, "If I
republish these works to-morrow, somebody else will bring
out an edition the day after, and so my capital will be lost;
give me indemnity, give me security, and I will lay out my
sell them at
capital in the republicationof these works,21and
2
public."
the
to
price
cheap
a comparatively
-Lord Chancellor, 1842
Extending copyright protection will be an incentive for U.S.
authors to continue using their creativity to produce works,
and provide copyright owners generally with the incentive
to restore older works and further disseminate them to the
public. Authors will be able to pass along to their children
213
and grandchildren the financial benefits of their works.
-House Report, 1995
[P]aradoxicalas it might seem-it was undoubtedly true,
that in some instances where copyright existed, books could
be sold even cheaper than where there was none. This
applied to works of greatpopularity, and requiringa large
number of editions, some in one size and some in anothersome with large type and some with small-so as to meet
the various tastes ofpurchasers. Now, if a work of this kind
were illustratedwith many expensive plates or maps, then it
might be published at a cheaper rate by a bookseller who
had the exclusive right of issuing it, than by several, who
would each of them be obliged to incur the expense of
having a separate set of plates engraved. It was therefore
was in all cases enhanced
not clear, that the price of works
214
copyright.
of
by the existence
-Viscount

212. 63 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 786 (Eng.).
213. H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 4 (1995).
214. 52 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1840) 409-10 (Eng.).
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Whatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects
and preserve [sic]. The quality of the print is soon
degraded. There is no one who will invest the funds for
enhancement because there is no longer an incentive to
rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can offer
for sale. A public domain work is an orphan. No one is
responsible for its life. But everyone exploits its use, until
that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard,
barren of its previous virtues. How does the consumer
benefit from the steady decline of a film's quality? What
academics offer in numbing detail are the arcane drudgeries
of graphs and charts, all of which dwell in ivory tower
25
isolation, separated from the realisms of the marketplace. 1
-Jack Valenti, 1995
Where there was no copyright, great works often became
scarce and got out of print. The works of Bacon and
Hobbes were difficult to get, because it was nobody's
216
interest to publish them.
-Mr. Milnes, 1842
b. CON-Those who opposed retroactive application of any term
extension argued that it created no incentive for creation, as the work
already existed, and deprived the public of anticipated unfettered
access.
[A]s much as we may want to, we cannot provide an
incentive to create something that has already been created!
This Bill would retroactively apply term extension to add
20 years of protection for works already in existence.
Furthermore, many of the creators of these prior works are
dead. No grant of additional time will help them create, but
it will give the current owners.., an enormous windfall at
217
the expense of consumers.
-Senator

Brown, 1996

215. HearingBefore S. JudiciaryComm., supra note 178, at 42 (statement of
Jack Valenti).
216. 61 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 1387 (Eng.).
217. S.REP. No. 104-315, at 32 (1996) (minority view of Sen. Brown).
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It was, moreover, an ex post facto law, and therefore still
more objectionable. It gave to authors the copyright of
works already publishedfor sixty years, instead of twentyeight. There was just as much right to take from the
author's term fourteen years as to deprive the public
of
2 18
Bill.
this
of
effect
the
was
right-which
years'
thirty-two
-- Mr. Baines, 1839
Obviously, justifications based on the provision of
incentives to creativity are irrelevant where the works
subject to terms extension are already in being. Indeed,
such an extension can only serve to [act] as a disincentive to
new creativity, in that it must to some extent tend to
discourage the making of new works derivative of those for
which protection has been extended, which would otherwise
21 9
be in the public domain.
-Professor

Jaszi, 1995

He would direct their Lordships' attention for a few
moments to the 4th clause, which proposed to extend the
term of copyright to works publishedprior to the passing of
the act. He thought this clause would operate most
injuriously to the public ....
Works were written and
published with a full knowledge of the law relating to
copyright. The author certainly could not complain of
being treatedunfairly; but by the 4th clause it was proposed
to take away from the public an interest in which they had a
legal right, and it gave the author an extended term of
copyright in books published before
this act was proposed
22 0
Parliament.
of
adoption
for the
-Lord Cottenham, 1842

218. 45 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1839) 936 (Eng.).

219. HearingBefore S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 178, at 75 (statement of
Peter Jaszi).
220. 63 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1842) 810 (Eng.).
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The parallels between the debates over the Talfourd Act and the
Sonny Bono Act, like the similarities between "re-origination" and
"transformative use," demonstrate that, indeed, "everything old is
new again." It is not enough, though, to look back from today to
yesterday for lessons to be learned: we must continue to do so in the
future, and it is with the future in mind that I close this article.
E. The Next Time?
In his appearance before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on September 20, 1995 Professor Peter Jaszi stated:
Nineteen years ago, the Copyright Act of 1976 added 19
years to the life of then-subsisting renewal copyrights. The
current legislation would add 20 more years. A cynical
observer might be forgiven the suspicion that it represents a
downpayment on perpetual copyright on the installment
plan, thus raising obvious and substantial constitutional
issues... 221
Professor Jaszi went on to state, "it is my opinion that ...
across-the-board copyright term extension of the sort proposed...
may well constitute a violation of the 'limited times' provision of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution."222 He cautioned,
The question of how often, and under what circumstances,
Congress would have to extend subsisting copyrights in
order to run afoul of the "limited times" language of the
Copyright Clause is an interesting one, which would be
likely to be litigated seriously were this term extension
223
measure to become law.
His prophecy proved accurate. In 1999, Eric Eldred and others
who commercially exploited public domain works challenged the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act as a violation of the First
Amendment and, with respect to the retrospective extension of
copyright, as beyond the Congress's enumerated power under the
Copyright Clause. 224 The plaintiffs lost in the district court 2 25 and in
221. HearingBefore S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 178, at 72 (statement of
Peter Jaszi) (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 77.
223. Id. at 124.
224. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 239 F.3d 372

(D.C. Cir. 2001), aff'dsub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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the Court of Appeals. 226 They fared no better in the Supreme
Court. 2 27 The petitioners argued that "even if.the CTEA's 20-year
term extension is literally a 'limited Tim[e],' permitting Congress to
extend existing copyrights allows it to evade the 'limited Times'
constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights., 2 28 The
Supreme Court disagreed. 229 So, the twenty-year term extension was
upheld.2 3 °
Professor Jaszi had posited that the twenty-year term extension
was merely a down payment on perpetual copyright. The Supreme
Court, as had the Court of Appeals below, held that a "regime of
perpetual copyrights 'clearly is not the situation before us."' ' 23 One
might, however, still ask whether the Sonny Bono Act is merely a
down payment on perpetual copyright. Let's take a look at the
legislative history.
In a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual property on June 27, 1997, Chairman Coble posed a
question to Fritz Attaway, Senior Vice-President, Government
Relations, and General Counsel, Motion Picture Association of
America:

225. Id. at 3.
226. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380.
227. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
228. Id. at 208.
229. Id. "Nothing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA's 20year term extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the
'limited Times' constraint." Id. at 209. It is interesting to note that, in Eldred
v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court cited to Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the
English Language for the definition of limited: "At the time of the Framing,
that word meant what it means today: 'confine[d] within certain bounds',
'restrain[ed]', or 'circumscrib[ed]."' Id. at 199 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (7th ed. 1785)).
230. In the spirit of "everything old is new again," it is worth comparing
Donaldson v. Beckett in 1774 and Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003. Each was
brought before that nation's highest tribunal: in England, the House of Lords
and in the United States, the Supreme Court. Each upheld a legislative
enactment: in England, the Statute of Anne, and in the United States, the
Sonny Bono Act. In each, the plaintiff lost: in England, Thomas Beckett, and
in the United States, Eric Eldred. Despite these similarities, there was one
great difference: in England, the decision upheld a shorter copyright term than
that claimed by the plaintiff, and in the United States, the decision upheld a
longer term than that claimed by the plaintiff!.
231. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209.
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Let us assume that this [twenty year] extension is enacted
and approved, and then some guy comes along and says,
maybe we need to extend it again. How long or how many
times could the term be extended without running afoul of
the constitutional structure allowing a grant for a limited
32
time?

2

Mr. Attaway responded:
It could be that in 2020, circumstances would suggest that
an additionalterm be provided. I think it is a balance, and I
think the world is coming to the conclusion that the correct
balance today is life plus 70....233
Congresswoman Bono, widow of performer, songwriter and
congressman Sonny Bono, speaking of her late husband said:
Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last
forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would
violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me
to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available
to us. As you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal
for term to last forever less one day.234 Perhaps the
Committee may look at that next Congress.
If the Sonny Bono Act is a down payment, when will the next
installment come due? Mickey Mouse, in the guise of "Steamboat
Willie," was born in 1928.235 But for the term extension, the first
version of "Steamboat Willie" would have been in the public domain
232. Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical
Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per Program
Licenses: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of

the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 83 (1997).

233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Bono).

235. "On November 18, 1928, a little known character named Mickey
Mouse stepped onto the silver screen." Legend on back of packaging for a
STEAMBOAT WILLIE 1928 Holiday Plate 2000. Admittedly, the performance
on "the silver screen" was not, itself, a publication. Ferris v. Frohman, 223
U.S. 424, 425 (1912). However, as the film was registered on December 16,
1930 by Walter E. Disney with a "publication" date of November 21, 1928, the
film was subject to a finite term of copyright protection. Thus, under the 1976
Act, the copyright would have expired on December 31, 2003 (n.b., the legend
on the plate package states a date of November 18, 1928, whereas, the
registration form listed November 21, 1928).
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at the end of 2003. The first bill to extend copyright by twenty years
was introduced in 1995, some eight years before the first "Steamboat
Willie" publications would be in the public domain. As it is,
"Steamboat Willie" is protected through 2023. If the same timetable
were followed as was done with respect to the 1998 Act, a Bill would
be introduced in 2015, some ten years from now. This is not to say
that Disney will, in fact, seek an extension, or that Superman, born in
1933 (the same year as your author), would seek protection beyond
2028 for his first publication, but, the two statements quoted above
suggest that those who opposed the extension were not merely
alarmists saying that the "sky is falling."
It requires no particular citation to the myriad of articles in
newspapers and magazines to suggest that the last several years have
witnessed a widespread disregard of U.S. copyright law (and the
copyright laws of other nations as well). Clearly, digital technology
and the Internet have combined to create an environment in which
copyright is flouted on a worldwide basis even in countries with
highly developed and enforced domestic copyright laws such as the
United States. Peer-to-peer sharing of music has been a major
concern of the recording industry. Lawsuits have not only been filed
against service providers such as Napster, 236 Grokster, 237 and
but against individual consumers as well.239 The film
KaZaA,
industry is also concerned about unauthorized duplication of
DVDs.24 ° People who would never engage in shoplifting at a record
store or a video store think differently about unauthorized copying
via the Internet. The 108th attempted to respond to the challenge of
unauthorized copying without success. Presumably the 109th
Congress will continue the effort. I shall not attempt to explain why
otherwise law-abiding citizens flaunt the law where copyright is
involved. What I would suggest is that any further increase in the
term of copyright beyond that provided by the Sonny Bono Act is not
236. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002).
237. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213
(C.D. Cal. 2003), aff'd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004).

238. Id.

239. See, e.g., Sony Music Entm't, Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
240. See, e.g., Living Room Pirates,S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2004, at B8.
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likely to improve public attitudes towards copyright.
Over a century and a half ago, Thomas Babington, later Lord
Macaulay, made a dire prediction about a breakdown of respect for
copyright by the public. Given the current state of public attitude it
is worth reflecting on his words of caution, which I quote at length.
On February 5, 1841, Thomas Babington Macaulay said:
I am so sensible, Sir, of the kindness with which the House
has listened to me, that I will not detain you longer. I will
only say this,-that if the measure before us should pass,
and should produce one tenth part of the evil which it is
calculated to produce, and which I fully expect it to
produce, there will soon be a remedy, though of a very
objectionable kind. Just as the absurd acts which prohibited
the sale of game were virtually repealed by the poacher, just
as many absurd revenue acts have been virtually repealed
by the smuggler, will this law be virtually repealed by
piratical booksellers. At present the holder of copyright has
the public feeling on his side. Those who invade copyright
are regarded as knaves who take the bread out of the mouth
of deserving men. Every body is well pleased to see them
restrained by the law and compelled to refund their illgotten gains. No tradesmen of good repute will have
anything to do with such disgraceful transactions. Pass this
law: and that feeling is at an end. Men of a character very
different from that of the present race of piratical
booksellers will soon infringe this intolerable monopoly.
Great masses of capital will be constantly employed in the
violation of the law. Every art will be employed to evade
legal pursuit; and the whole nation will be in the plot. On
which side indeed should the public sympathy be when the
question is whether some book as popular as Robinson
Crusoe, or the Pilgrim's Progress shall be in every cottage,
or whether it shall be confined to the libraries of the rich for
the advantage of the great grandson of a bookseller who, a
hundred years before, drove a hard bargain for the copyright
with the author when in great distress? Remember too that
when once it ceases to be considered as wrong and
discreditable to invade literary property, no person can say
where the invasion will stop. The public seldom makes
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nice distinctions. The wholesome copyright which now
exists will share in the disgrace and danger of the new
copyright which you are about to create. And you will find
that, in attempting to impose unreasonable restraints on the
reprinting of the works of the dead, you have, to a great
extent, annulled those restraints which 24now
prevent men
1
living.
the
defrauding
and
from pillaging
If there is a next time for a further proposed copyright term
extension, these words of Lord Macaulay provide a warning that may
be even more compelling in the future than it was in 1841. It would
be well advised to keep Macaulay's warning in mind, for, as
Santayana reminds us, "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to repeat it," 242 or as the song says:
Don't throw the past away, you might need it some rainy
day!

241. 56 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1841) 356-57 (Eng.).
242. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (1905).
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